Simplicity and Market Design

Why are actual contracts and market mechanisms often simpler than our theoretical predictions?

This is a central puzzle in microeconomics and, in many environments, it constrains our ability to rely on economic models. It raises further fundamental questions: What does it mean that a contract or a mechanism is simple? How to compare the simplicity of various contracts, mechanisms, and games?

The proposed research program aims to address these questions and provide a new behaviorally- grounded foundation for market design, contract theory, and the analysis of simplicity.

The program has three complementary parts: (i) to address the simplicity puzzle by developing a novel approach to contracting and mechanism design that takes into account perception errors; (ii) to operationalize what simplicity means and how various mechanisms, contracts, and games can be compared in terms of their simplicity; and (iii) to explore the trade-offs between simplicity and welfare-and-revenue criteria and to develop new practical market mechanisms for markets such as school choice, the assignment of medical transplants, and the auctions of commodities and government securities.