Moral Vagueness in a Mind-Independent World

Sometimes, there is vagueness about whether it is morally permissible to perform a certain act—moral vagueness. This raises a question: what is the source of moral vagueness?

To approach this question, it is standard to assume that, as many hold, we live in a robustly realist moral world—a mind-independent world.

The central hypothesis of this project is that if we live in such a world, then the two leading accounts of the source of moral vagueness—moral epistemicism and (what might be called) moral indeterminacism—have distinct and significant implications for what we ought to do, all things considered, when confronted with moral vagueness.

This, it will be argued, has been overlooked in previous research, and it promises both to evade a serious worry at the heart of the search for the source of moral vagueness and to set a new path for finding the source. The main objective of the project is to confirm that hypothesis.

The project combines the expertise of the Experienced Researcher (ER) in vagueness and decision-making with the internationally-recognised expertise of the supervisor (Matti Eklund) in vagueness and meta-ethics, and the strengths of the host organisation (Uppsala University) in theoretical and practical philosophy.

The project will greatly improve the ER’s career prospects, especially given the excellent match between the expertise of the supervisor and that of the ER and the consequent training and mentorship that the ER will receive.

Meanwhile, in light of the project’s engagement with issues that connect many sub-disciplines of philosophy, the host organisation will benefit from the ER’s inter-sub-disciplinary contribution to its research activities and the networking opportunities that will ensue.