The Origins of Elite Defections

Autocrats cannot rule alone. To guarantee their personal safety/regime survival, they often build authoritarian parties/coalitions. In return for their services and support, authoritarian elites receive benefits, privileges, spoils and protection. This support, however, is not unconditional and autocrats know so.

Therefore, they have to constantly watch over these elites -and resort to blackmail, repression, or jailing- to prevent splits and/or spin-off movements that could lead to regime collapse.

In spite of the uncertainty and risks that come with defections, including losing privileges, benefits or protection, some elites still choose to break away. Why does this happen?

Several studies have looked at the role of defectors in transition processes and have tried to answer why defections occur.

They have found that spoil-sharing, institutional framework, co-optation, repression, economic crisis or liberalization (or lack thereof) can promote elite cohesion or, in turn, incentivize defections. While this scholarship makes important contributions, several questions remain. Given that defections do not always occur at once, what explains defections over time?

To what extent do linkages to the opposition and their capacity to absorb defectors matter? Does international pressure hinder or promote defections? Does regime popularity inhibit defections?

By using quantitative and qualitative tools and a cross-regional comparative approach, this project titled The Origins of Elite Defections will address these questions.

So far there has been no systematic research on defectors in Latin America that combines both qualitative (elite interviews) and quantitative analysis (creation of original database on defectors), with a cross-regional comparison using African cases, such as Ghana and Uganda.

In doing so, this project will shed light on the patterns and timing of defections thereby contributing to a better understanding of authoritarian demise and survival.