Pain and Pleasure in Ancient Greek Theories of Emotion

My doctoral thesis aims to examine the role of pleasure and pain in ancient Greek emotions, focussing on the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, i.e. on the very beginnings of systematic thought about emotion in the Western tradition. In the Platonic dialogue Philebus, Socrates argues that any pleasure found in emotion is 'contaminated' with pain (Phlb. 47d-50e).

Since pleasure in emotion is excluded from the class of pure (painless) pleasures, we can assume with relative certainty that emotional pleasures cannot but be mixed with pain. Thus, I will propose that Plato supported the idea that all emotions without exception are inherently 'mixed', in the sense that each emotion feels both painful and pleasant simultaneously.In his Rhetoric, Aristotle specifies that pain and pleasure are essential features of emotions, yet it is unclear whether these two sensations co-occur in every single feeling (Rhet. 2.1, 1378a19-23; cf.

Konstan 2006: 33-4). In the definition of anger, a painful emotion, Aristotle refers to Achilles' wrath to illustrate that pleasure in anger derives from the prospect of obtaining redress (2.2, 1378b5-6). But, unlike Plato, Aristotle seems to believe that only some emotions are bittersweet.

Still, it remains highly necessary to investigate how an Aristotelian passion could ever contain both sensations.In other words, how can one emotion have both positive and negative valence? The Greek concepts of pleasure and pain seem to correspond to two core emotional dimensions recognised by contemporary emotion theories in psychology and cognitive science, primarily to the modern category of 'affective valence' and secondarily to 'arousal' (Cairns 2021: 19).

As such, pleasure and pain have been conceived as fundamental properties of emotions from antiquity to the modern era and the question of whether emotions can involve mixed valence is a lively and highly contested one (Colombetti 2005, Cova and Deonna 2014, Russell 2017, Campeggiani 2021).

Returning to the above question, we can tackle the question of the possibility of mixed valence by turning our attention to the function of desire and imagination in emotion. In most, if not all, emotions there is an element of desire, and the frustration or satisfaction of a desire always causes pain or pleasure respectively. For example, if anger is a desire for revenge (Rhet. 2.2, 1378a30), those who are angry are distressed when they fail to retaliate and pleased when they anticipate revenge (1.11, 1370b31-2, 2.2, 1378b2-10).

Alternatively, the recurring appearance of impression or imagination in Aristotle's definitions of emotions indicates that this a mental faculty involved in all emotions (cf. Moss 2012). There are two kinds of imagined pleasures (and pains), anticipatory and memorial (1.11, 1370a27-34).

For instance, if anger is a kind of pain due to a perceived slight, the pleasure derived from anger is the anticipation of future revenge (cf. Wolfsdorf 2013: 22, 130n.31). I will approach the above matters by taking into consideration the following questions.

What is the function of pleasure and pain in emotion? If Plato understood emotions as amalgams of pleasure and pain, how does he explain this hedonic mixture? How does Plato's account of the mixed nature of emotion differ from Aristotle's?

And, lastly, how can ancient perspectives on mixed feelings reshape modern understandings of valence? Since neither pleasure nor pain has been investigated with a focus on their role on emotion but rather as independent philosophical concepts, my project aims to remedy this gap by bringing together the Greek notions of pain, pleasure, and emotion. Illuminating, in turn, the relationship between these three will help reconsider modern conceptions of valence.

Adopting an interdisciplinary approach based on ancient philosophical and contemporary psychological studies, I will shed light for the first time on Plato's and subsequently Aristotle's views on pleasure, pain and emotion.