Ambivalence: A New Unified Theory about Its Nature, Grounds, and Application to Normative Conflicts

This project investigates how ambivalence can help to deal with normative conflicts.

These conflicts are due to clashes in values and make it challenging to decide how to best act, feel, or react in certain situations.

We suggest that feeling ambivalent (having “mixed feelings”) is an appropriate response to such conflicts and a valuable tool for navigating them.

The project develops a new and unified theory of ambivalence that explains its nature and normative implications, insights lacking in the philosophical literature. In doing so, it answers three questions: Q1. What is ambivalence and when is it appropriate to be ambivalent? Q2. How is ambivalence grounded in value?

Q3. What are the normative implications of ambivalence?

Each question is investigated under one part of the project, each lasting one year, using standard methods from analytic philosophy and a novel value framework.

Our account challenges traditional approaches that see ambivalence as a flaw, arguing that ambivalence is a sign of normative competence.

Our research contributes to long-lasting debates on value conflicts, uncertainty, and incommensurability, advancing our knowledge in several fields in normative ethics including value theory, decision theory, virtue ethics, and philosophy of emotions.

The implications extend to individuals and society since ambivalence can foster moral education and prevent polarization. It involves a core research team and an international collaborative group.