Decentralized Cryptographic Systems

Much of our digital infrastructure still relies on centralized systems, which are prone to failure and, more importantly, present appealing targets for criminals and other ill-intentioned parties.

A successful attack on a centralized system can have huge repercussions in terms of loss of confidentiality, integrity and availability of data and services: alas, once private data leaks, it is impossible to “put it back” into the confidential domain.

The fragility of centralized systems is one of the reasons that the interest in decentralized cryptographic systems (such as Secure Multiparty Computation, Blockchains, and Threshold Cryptography) has surged in recent years.

Decentralized systems are more resilient against external and internal threats: even if some fractions of the parties are corrupt and misbehave, it is still possible to guarantee crucial security properties such as data privacy and correctness of outcomes.

However, as these systems get deployed and used by citizens and institutions, it becomes evident that many of the assumptions made in the scientific literature do not match the reality in which such systems are used: as security proofs might no longer hold, this opens the door for potentially catastrophic security consequences.

With this project I intend to take a step back and design cryptographic systems with solid theoretical foundations, with focus on ensuring that the abstract models in which cryptographic systems are designed and proven secure are a close match to the everchanging reality in which they get deployed, addressing e.g., the peculiar nature of decentralized systems and the challenges presented by advances in quantum computing.

A successful outcome of the project will lead to novel, more efficient, and more secure cryptographic protocols for complex tasks.

All the results of the projects will be made publicly available to help companies and society secure the critical infrastructures underlying their digital interactions.