Agency in Law

The distinction between agents and non-agents is central in law: only agents can decide about their affairs, enter contracts or be held responsible for their actions.

Western law has since the 19th century relied on an understanding of agency that has developed in the liberal tradition of thought. According to this Liberal Agency, agents are highly rational human individuals.

Persons with cognitive disabilities, artificial intelligences, and nonhuman animals are therefore not agents because of their lack of rationality or humanity.

This view of agency is deeply embedded in Western legal systems.Liberal Agency has recently come under increasing criticism and challenges.

Many now argue that persons with disabilities, artificial intelligences and/or nonhuman animals could in fact be treated as agents.

However, these criticisms have been narrow in scope, and the debate is overall highly fragmented.LEGACY, situated within legal philosophy and history, will offer a comprehensive reappraisal of legal agency.

It will investigate three main questions: First, how did Liberal Agency become the dominant understanding of agency in law? Second, what challenges confront Liberal Agency today?

And finally, what kind of a theory can best explain the evolving notion of agency in law?The objectives of the project are to deliver:(1) a systematic understanding of the historical background and context of Liberal Agency, its spread in Western legal thought, and its challengers;(2) an in-depth analysis of contemporary agency accounts that incorporates and conceptualizes the historical insights with a systematic understanding of the contemporary debates; and(3) a theory of agency that provides an overall synthesis of the accounts and can explain, reconcile and/or solve the outlined contemporary challenges.The project will thus develop a historically informed, comprehensive and rigorous understanding of legal agency, based on a broad synthesis of legal and philosophical thought.