A Theory of Memory Causation

On the causal theory of memory, remembering an event requires a causal connection to a past experience. I can remember my last birthday because I have experienced it before.

On the simulation theory, in contrast, remembering a past event is very much like imagining a future one: in both cases, a causal connection to a first-hand experience of the event is not necessary.

The debate between causalists and simulationists has been at center stage in the thriving new field of philosophy of memory. Despite this, there has been no systematic analysis of the notion of causation relevant to memory.

As a result, the nature of memory causation has remained largely unexplored.This project aims to fill this significant lacuna.

It will develop the first comprehensive theory of memory causation, bringing together results from the philosophy of causation and the interdisciplinary study of memory.

It will aim to clarify what it means to say that memories are caused by past experiences and to establish whether such causation is necessary.

The project's core thesis is that claims about memory causation should be relativized to causal models — mathematical models that represent the functional relationships between variables in a system.

A memory is caused by a past experience iff, relative to an appropriate model of the memory system, it is counterfactually dependent on it, but only in precisely defined contexts. If all memories are so dependent, then causation is necessary for remembering. With a proper formulation, the causal necessity thesis can be assessed.

The working hypothesis is that the thesis faces substantial difficulties and is likely false. Hence, causal theories fail and the simulationist rejection of the necessity of appropriate causation is warranted.

The project will make an innovative and much-needed contribution to the central debate of contemporary philosophy of memory, helping us understand what memory is.